Welcome to Part 9 of my analysis of Jerry Coyne’s book, Faith vs. Fact. In these next two posts, I will take a look at chapter 4: “Faith Strikes Back,” in which Coyne addresses a number of arguments used to challenge his assertion that religion and science are in conflict. In the first part of the chapter, he attempts to describe theistic evolution as the “new natural theology,” and then addresses three specific “accommodationist arguments: (1) The Argument for God from “Fine-Tuning,” (2) The Argument for God from Morality, and (3) The Argument that Science is Not the Only Way of Knowing. In the second part of the chapter, he addresses what he calls the “Scientism Canard,” and then attempts to refute a number of other arguments that “accommodationists” make: (1) Science Can’t Prove God Doesn’t Exist, (2) Science itself is Based on Faith, (3) Religion Gave Rise to Science, and (4) Science Sometimes Does Bad Things.
The entire chapter is about 75 pages, so there is no way I will be able to address everything Coyne discusses in it within the span of two posts. That being said, I will do my best to address what I feel are the more important (or at least interesting) items in the chapter.
Theistic Evolution, Natural Theology, and Intelligent Design—All the Same!
The first thing Coyne does in this chapter is equate theistic evolution with natural theology. Natural theology has been around since ancient times, but the kind that Coyne is referring to is primarily the arguments of William Paley in the 18th century. Paley was essentially the grandfather of the modern Intelligent Design movement. The argument goes like this: if you look at all the utter complexity in nature, there simply is no way that it could have all happened by blind chance—the complexity itself is evidence of some sort of Intelligent Designer.
In any case, Coyne claims that Darwin’s theory of evolution was a “dismantling of the best argument for God ever derived from nature” (154). For time’s sake, I will just refer to a post I wrote a few years ago about this very topic. In short, Darwin’s theory did, in fact, blow a hole in Paley’s I.D. argument, but that argument was based on a very deistic concept of God being a watchmaker and the world being a mechanized watch. But that concept simply wasn’t a biblical concept of God and His relationship to the world in the first place. If you want to read more about that, I will refer you to my earlier post.
It must be said, though, that Coyne’s entire argument that theistic evolution is the equivalent of natural theology and Intelligent Design is simply baffling. He even goes so far to describe Francis Collins, the former head of the Human Genome Project and the founder of BioLogos, as “a strong opponent of intelligent design, and has repeatedly warned about using ‘god of the gaps’ argument” (155). Once again, Coyne conflates things of which he has no understanding. To be clear, theistic evolution is not the same thing as intelligent design. Theistic evolution does not point to the complexity of nature and claim it is “proof” of God. It makes the argument that evolution is true and that it doesn’t conflict with Christianity or the Bible. The fact that Coyne can’t differentiate between the two, although not surprising, is still nevertheless telling.
The Argument from Morality
The next part of Coyne’s chapter that I want to touch upon is what he says about the Argument for God from Morality. I first came across this argument back when I was 17, when I read C.S. Lewis’ Mere Christianity—I still find it to be convincing and logical. There are many wrinkles to the argument, but the gist of it is that human beings’ sense of morality is something not shared with the rest of nature. Cultures around the world and throughout history may differ on some specifics of what is moral/immoral, but throughout humanity there is a sense of right/wrong. Hence, the uniquely human concept of “morality” and “immorality” sets human beings apart from the rest of the animal kingdom and points the existence of a God who is interested in right and wrong.
Now, is that a “scientific” argument? No. Is that an argument using methodological naturalism? Of course not—for the very heart of the argument is that our sense of morality cannot be explained through solely naturalistic means. Not surprisingly, that is the very reason why Coyne rejects it.
The naturalistic explanations Coyne ends up offering are the same arguments I addressed in a few previous posts I wrote when I did my analysis of Dan Barker’s book Mere Morality. You can read my thoughts in more detail in these posts:
Morality, Torah, and Further Clarification
Mere Morality (Part 1): The Passing Grade for Morality
Mere Morality (Part 2): Religious Values and Human Values
Mere Morality (Part 3): Morality Genes and Cultural Memes
Mere Morality (Part 4): Reason, Law and Rebellion
Mere Morality (Part 5): God, Morality and Ethnic Cleansing?
Mere Morality (Part 6): Rebellion, Curses and Evil
Mere Morality (Part 7): Thus Concludes the Matter
For our purposes here, though, a brief overview of Coyne’s comments are in order. He (like Barker) argues that our sense of morality comes from a combination of evolution/natural selection, reason, and cultural education. He basically argues that morality is in our genes, that we share “the same genes for moral feelings” with other animals, and that these genes have been passed down from a common ancestor.
In regard to altruism, Coyne argues that there are valid nonreligious explanations for that too. For example, a rich man gives money to charities and museums or sets up an endowment for the purpose of enhancing a good reputation. He writes, “Altruism might have evolved as a reciprocal phenomenon that was adaptive for individuals in small groups, and it might also be a way of burnishing one’s reputation, explaining why we usually don’t hide our generosity under a bushel” (173). He also states that the impulse to save one’s child is “certainly built into us by natural selection” (175).
To the point, I don’t find any of Coyne’s arguments convincing. For example, he points to things like chimps helping other chimps from drowning as a way of arguing that morality is simply a genetic phenomenon passed down via natural selection. Okay, but does anyone say that a chimp who might do that is “acting morally” or is a “moral chimpanzee”? Sometimes, primates fight and literally beat each other to death and tear each other apart. Does anyone say that such things are “immoral” acts? The answer to both questions is “No.”
First off, noting similar behaviors between human beings and the rest of the animal kingdom is not what is at issue. Yes, humans sometimes help other human beings. Yes, they sometimes do violence to other human beings. But it is only among human beings that any concept of morality is applied. Pointing to similar behaviors does not negate the fact that a sense of morality and right/wrong is only applied to human behavior, not animal behavior. And that is what is different.
Secondly, although many people might be helped when a rich man gives money to a charity, if in reality he doesn’t care for poor people and just did it to bolster his reputation (or perhaps to get some tax breaks), no one in their right mind would say he is acting morally, or that he is a moral person for making the contribution.
And finally, Coyne’s statement that the impulse to save one’s child if that child is in danger is “certainly built into us by natural selection” is nothing more than a baseless assertion.
Is Science the Only Way of Knowing?
Coyne also takes issues with the “accommodationist” claim that there are other ways of coming to a knowledge and understanding of truth and reality than just science. It is at this point that Coyne plays a kind of a shell game by providing an altered definition of “science.” He calls it “science broadly construed,” and includes under that term disciplines like economics, history etc. He then turns to the Oxford English Dictionary (he does this a lot in the book) and notes that Truth is defined as “conformity with fact and agreement with reality.” And since we’re talking about the facts about the universe, Coyne says, we’re talking about scientific facts: “Any discipline that studies the universe using the methods of ‘broad’ science is capable in principle of finding truth and producing knowledge. If it doesn’t, no knowledge is possible. Valid ‘ways of knowing’ then, certainly include history, archeology, linguistics, psychology, sociology, and economics, all of which, to greater or lesser degrees, use the methods of science” (187).
If you are impressed with that argument, let me suggest that you are easily duped by word salad, sprinkled with tautology croutons. Let’s just tease this out a bit. The claim is that truth and knowledge about reality is not limited to the scientific method—i.e. there is more to reality that simple scientific facts about the natural world. Coyne’s response is basically, “Nu-uh! Look at this definition in the dictionary! Truth is facts about reality; reality is scientific facts! No knowledge is possible unless it scientifically factual, because scientific facts are all of reality…that’s the truth! Look at this definition in the dictionary!”
On a personal note, as a teacher, whenever I read a paper in which the student says something like, “The dictionary defines this word this way…” I want to beat the kid with a rubber hose. It is beyond pedantic and lame.
In any case, Coyne does get around to addressing the arguments that morality and the Arts are “ways of knowing” that goes beyond the scientific method. I’ll refer you to my above posts about morality to read a fuller discussion on that topic, but I do want to briefly point out Coyne’s specific take on what is moral. He calls himself a “consequentialist” and says, “what is moral is what promotes a situation that you prefer, like harmonious societies, the well-being and flourishing of other people, and so on” (189). Please note, that is not a “scientific” or objective explanation or definition of morality. It is completely and utterly subjective to its core.
Furthermore, if morality is simply that which “promotes a situation you prefer,” then everything is moral. Stalin preferred to starve 7 million Ukrainians in one winter—that’s moral according to Coyne! Jeffery Epstein preferred to sexually abuse young women and girls—that’s moral according to Coyne! Now, in reality, I’m sure Coyne would say those actions are immoral—but that would just show he is being wholly inconsistent with his stated definition of morality.
Coyne then moves on to the argument that the Arts (be it painting, music, or literature) is a way of knowing that outside the realm of science. On this topic, I really don’t know how to respond to Coyne’s comments. To be honest, they just strike me as bizarre:
“I have asked literature professors and critics to give me examples of truths actually revealed for the first time by literature, rather than affirmed by it, and haven’t received a single convincing answer. I would expect the same equivocation for music, painting, and other art, save for their ability (as in photography and painting) to tell us what something looked like. Art can prompt us to find truth, but in the end that truth must be based on reason and observation” (193).
“I’m certainly not going to argue art it worthless. Far from it. I derive immense satisfaction from books and paintings. But I appreciate them for their emotional resonance, for the depiction of other points of view, and for sheer aesthetics. Despite all this, I argue that art cannot ascertain truth or knowledge of the universe, simply because it lacks the tools of such inquiry” (193).
When presented with the claim that the Arts open us up to a knowledge and understanding of reality that the scientific method can’t touch, Coyne’s reply is essentially, “Oh yeah? Name one ‘truth’ (and remember, he defines truth as knowledge about scientific facts!) discovered by literature/music/painting for the first time!” Who says that? The point is that the Arts are a way of coming to an understanding of reality that goes beyond the scientific method, and yet Coyne responds with, “I won’t believe it unless you can show me one thing they prove scientifically!” I am honestly at a loss. As for the second quote, I can’t get out of my head this picture of the robot girl from the 80’s Sitcom Small Wonder saying it.
In my next post, I’ll address how Coyne answers the claims that (1) Science can’t prove God doesn’t exist and that (2) Religion gave rise to science.
Keep up the good work!!
Which we are to interpret as metaphor analogy or literal?
It does however, speak to certain (violent?) thought processes you have as this is not something I, or anyone I know who has children, would ever even think let alone vocalise or put in writing.
It also suggests your teaching methods might benefit from a different approach?
We obviously move I different circles.
Oh, and on the topic of violence I am still waiting for you to provide Coyne’s quote regarding Galileo being tortured by the Inquisition and thrown in prison.